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SEX OFFENSES AND DUE PROCESS: WHEN PUBLIC OPINION 
CONTRADICTS SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS 
Matthew Jerrehian* 
 
“[N]or can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference 
concerning real existence and matter of fact.” 
—David Hume1  
 
In 2019, Tennessee passed a statute forbidding certain sexual offenders 
from residing with—or being alone with—their own children.
2
  The same year, 
the North Carolina Supreme Court struck down a statute imposing lifetime 
ankle monitoring on sex offenders.
3
  On January 22, 2020, the New York 
Assembly began considering a bill that would allow the Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority to ban sex offenders from public transportation.
4
  All 
of this aggressive legislation has arisen despite a scientific consensus that it does 
not protect the public and sometimes even increases recidivism rates.
5
 
The abduction of eleven-year-old Jacob Wetterling in 1989 triggered a 
nationwide pursuit of policies that would prevent crimes against children, and 
legislatures settled on monitoring and restricting the actions of people 
previously convicted of sexual offenses.
6
  Wetterling was abducted by a person 
previously convicted of a sexual offense, and the United States Congress 
responded by requiring each state to create a registry system.
7
  These 
 
*  Juris Doctor Candidate, 2021, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., Philosophy, 2015, 
Middlebury College. Thank you to Professor David Rudovsky for his inspiration and thoughtful 
supervision on this Comment. 
 1 DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 17 (Eric Steinberg ed., 
Hackett Publ’g Co. 2d ed. 1993) (1777). 
 2 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211(c) (2019). 
 3 State v. Grady, 831 S.E.2d 542, 547–48, 572 (N.C. 2019). 
 4 S. 7508-B, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2020).  
 5 See infra note 34; see generally RICHARD G. WRIGHT, SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, 
NEW DIRECTIONS (2d ed. 2015) (finding, among other conclusions, that “empirical studies on GPS 
monitoring do not support the finding that it reduces recidivism or helps to protect the community”). 
 6 Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in Sex Offender 
Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1076–77 (2012). 
 7 Id. 
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restrictions have become increasingly severe over time
8
: legislatures have 
banned convicted offenders from living in certain places,
9
 forbidden them 
from using social media,
10
 and even required them to wear ankle monitors for 
the rest of their lives.
11
  While some such restrictions have been struck down 
as violating the United States Constitution or a state constitution, many 
remain.
12
  Studies have repeatedly shown that these laws are ineffective or 
counterproductive at preventing recidivism, but courts and legislatures have 
been unresponsive to the science.
13
 
The issue is not only whether legislatures are free to regulate sex offenders 
in this way but also whether they are free to enact regulations under the pretext 
of public safety no matter what their actual effect is on the public.  Courts 
should not defer to legislative determinations when they are clearly contrary 
to the data.  If legislatures were free to ban former sex offenders from living in 
a city despite an abundance of evidence that such a ban harms public safety,
14
 
they would also have the power to ban people who have been convicted of any 
crime, people with unpaid parking tickets, or even everyone who has read 
Lolita. 
This Comment argues that the due process clause of the Constitution of 
the United States and parallel clauses of state constitutions require courts to 
examine the scientific evidence undermining sex offender statutes.  After 
explaining the mistake courts make by refusing to consider the evidence, I 
examine the due process constraints that courts should find apply to these 
statutes.  The form of that requirement depends on the structure of the statute.  
If it applies only to dangerous offenders, there is a procedural due process 
right to present evidence of non-dangerousness.  If it applies to all people 
 
 8 Id. at 1078. 
 9 Fross v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 20 A.3d 1193, 1197 (Pa. 2011). 
 10 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1733 (2017). 
 11 Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 307 (2015). 
 12 See generally Carol Schultz Vento, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State 
Statutes Authorizing Community Notification of Release of Convicted Sex Offender, 78 A.L.R.5TH 
489 (2000) (outlining cases challenging registration requirements under various constitutional 
provisions).  See also Elizabeth Reiner Platt, Gangsters to Greyhounds: The Past, Present, and Future 
of Offender Registration, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 727, 767–78 (2013) (summarizing 
constitutional challenges made to sex offender laws). 
 13 See generally RICHARD G. WRIGHT, supra note 5 (examining ineffective sex offender policies). 
 14 See, e.g., Fross v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 20 A.3d 1193, 1206–07 (Pa. 2011) (striking down a county 
ordinance that effectively banned former sex offenders from living in Pittsburg). 
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convicted of certain offenses, I argue that it violates substantive due process 
because empirical evidence shows that the statute has no rational basis. 
Part I of this Comment discusses the sex offender statutes in place and the 
scientific evidence for and against their effectiveness.  Part II explains the 
logical error that courts make by premising their reasoning on empirical claims 
while relying on deductive reasoning to make those claims.  Part III reviews 
the precedent for incorporating sex offender data into court decisions in other 
areas of law.  Part IV argues that sex offender statutes that ignore these data 
violate due process.  They violate procedural due process when they purport 
to restrict only dangerous offenders but provide no mechanism for offenders 
to show that they are not dangerous.  They violate substantive due process 
when they apply to all offenders, including those who pose no risk of 
recidivism.  Finally, these statutes violate the due process prohibition on 
irrebuttable presumptions in jurisdictions that follow that doctrine because 
they presume that all people convicted of a sex offense will reoffend and offer 
no opportunity to rebut that presumption.  As part of the due process analysis, 
courts have a duty to examine the available empirical data, and these 
constitutional provisions require courts to fulfill that duty. 
I.  THE STATUTES AND THE RESEARCH 
Sex offender statutes have developed in three major acts.  The 1994 
Wetterling Act established the registry system that required those convicted of 
certain sexual offenses to register their address information with local 
authorities, who were allowed to publicize it.
15
  Congress ensured state 
compliance with this Act by conditioning federal funds on its 
implementation.
16
  Second, Congress passed Megan’s Law in 1996, which 
made the release of registry information mandatory when “necessary to 
protect the public.”
17
  Third, the Adam Walsh Act,
18
 passed in 2006, made 
many significant changes, including that the registration requirements would 
depend solely on the conviction offense, rather than on a judicial assessment 
 
 15 Lori McPherson, The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) at 10 Years: 
History, Implementation, and the Future, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 741, 749 (2016) [hereinafter 
McPherson]. 
 16 Id. at 749–50. 
 17 Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345. 
 18 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 
[hereinafter Adam Walsh Act]. 
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of the individual defendant’s danger to the public.
19
  In addition to the federal 
statutes requiring that states maintain registry systems, state statutes also create 
collateral consequences of a sex offense conviction, including residency 
restrictions, GPS monitoring, bans on internet use, and employment 
restrictions.
20
  Some states have even banned people convicted of sex offenses 





All these restrictions also harm the offenders outside of what the restriction 
itself requires, from interfering with employment prospects to causing 
homelessness.  New York, for example, enacted a ban for some offenders on 
living within one thousand feet of a school,
23
 which rendered it virtually 
impossible to find housing in New York City, where schools are common and 
the population is dense.
24
  As a result, many released offenders in New York 
City are homeless but are denied access to shelters—most of which are within 
one thousand feet of a school—and the state instead houses them in prisons.
25
 
In McKune v. Lile, the Supreme Court upheld a state sex offender law, 
finding it justified because sex offenders have “a frightening and high risk of 
recidivism.”
26
  The Court gave no citation for that claim but did provide 
support earlier in the opinion,
27
 citing a Bureau of Justice Statistics report that 
addressed recidivism.
28
  Since the McKune decision, however, there has been 




First, contrary to the McKune Court’s claim, sex offenders are unlikely to 
commit a new sexual offense.  The reports cited in McKune found that 
 
 19 McPherson, supra note 15, at 764–68. 
 20 See id. at 785–90 (discussing such restrictions). 
 21 Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2004).  
 22 Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1115–1116, 1133 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 23 See N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-c(14) (forbidding a sentenced offender from knowingly entering onto 
school grounds);  In re Berlin v. Evans, 31 Misc. 3d 919, 928–29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) (finding the 
restriction not to reside within 1000 feet of a school as punitive as applied and would effectively 
banish the appellant from Manhattan). 
 24 Allison Frankel, Pushed Out and Locked In: The Catch-22 for New York’s Disabled, Homeless Sex-
Offender Registrants, 129 YALE L.J.F. 279, 286 (2019). 
 25 Id. at 292. 
 26 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002). 
 27 Id. at 32–33. 
 28 See LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., SEX OFFENSES 
AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 27 (1997) (finding that 
released rapists were to be 10.5 times more likely to be rearrested for rape).   
 29 WRIGHT, supra note 5. 
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released rapists were 10.5 times as likely as non-rapists to be rearrested for 
rape while those released after a sexual assault conviction were 7.5 times as 
likely to be rearrested for sexual assault.
30
  It is notable that these reports 
measured rearrest rates, not conviction rates, so the numbers are inflated.  
Since the publication of those reports, other studies have shown that the 
recidivism rate for people with prior sex offense convictions is lower than that 
for people with other convictions.
31
  Studies show that only 0.08-1.05% of 
former sexual offenders commit a new sexual offense within three years,
32
 and 
they are less likely to recidivate after that.
33
 
Second, even if sex offenders were likely to recidivate, the laws restricting 
them do not lower the chances of recidivism and may even raise them.  The 
registry system has been found to have either no impact on recidivism or to 
increase it.
34
  Residency restrictions remove offenders from their communities, 
alienate them, prevent them from accessing treatment, and increase the risk 
 
 30 LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., SEX OFFENSES AND 
OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 27 (1997). 
 31 See, e.g., PA. DEP’T OF CORR., RECIDIVISM REPORT 2013, at 21, tbl.12 (2013) (showing a lower 
recidivism rate for former sexual offenders than for other former offenders); Jill S. Levenson et al., 
Grand Challenges: Social Justice and the Need for Evidence-Based Sex Offender Registry Reform, 
43 J. SOCIO. & SOC. WELFARE 14 (2016) (“[L]ow risk sex offenders commit new sex crimes at rates 
below general criminal offenders . . . .”). 
 32 Press Release, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., Recidivism Rates Decrease for Third Consecutive Year (Mar. 10, 
2009), http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/IDOCRecidivism.pdf; CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., 
RECIDIVISM REPORT FOR OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION IN FISCAL YEAR 2014-15, at 35, tbl.13 (2020), 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/adult_research_branch/Research_Documents/2014_Outcome_Evaluation_
Report_7-6-2015.pdf.  See also R. Karl Hanson et al., Reductions in Risk Based on Time Offense-
Free in the Community: Once A Sexual Offender, Not Always A Sexual Offender, 24 PSYCH., PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 48, 59 (2017) (“The vast majority of individuals with a history of sexual crime desist from 
further sexual crime.”). 
 33 See Hanson, supra note 32, at 59 (“Risk in most individuals with a history of sexual crime will 
eventually decline to levels that are difficult to distinguish from the risk presented by the general 
population.”). 
 34 See, e.g., Amanda Y. Agan, Sex Offender Registries: Fear Without Function?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 207, 
235 (2011) (“The data in these three data sets do not strongly support the effectiveness of sex offender 
registries. . . .  This pattern of noneffectiveness across the data sets does not support the conclusion 
that sex offender registries are successful in meeting their objectives of increasing public safety and 
lowering recidivism rates.”); J.J. Prescott, Portmanteau Ascendant: Post-Release Regulations and Sex 
Offender Recidivism, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1035, 1040 (2016) (“[V]irtually no reliable empirical 
evidence exists to support claims that [sex offender post release] laws are effective at reducing sex 
offender recidivism, notwithstanding decades of scholarly effort.”). 
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that they will recidivate.
35
  A ban on internet use also interferes with a former 
offender’s ability to find a job and increases the chances of recidivism.
36
  The 
actual results of these laws are entirely contrary to their ostensible purpose. 
Previous scholarship has framed the preponderance of ineffective laws as 
a policy failure, but I argue that it is also a failure of the courts.  These statutes 
are not simply unwise: they are also unconstitutional. 
II.  THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ERROR: DEDUCTIVE REASONING AND 
QUESTIONS OF FACT 
The failure of courts to examine the data stems from their failure to 
recognize that deduction and induction are two distinct forms of reasoning 
which deliver two distinct forms of knowledge.  Deduction begins with 
premises and draws necessary conclusions, while induction begins with 
evidence and determines what it tends to show.
37
  Courts have mistakenly 
attempted to deduce facts about the external world: that sex offenders have a 
high recidivism rate, that treatment is not possible, and that regulations such 
as residency restrictions will reduce recidivism.  These claims require data to 
support them. 
 
 35 See Taurean J. Shattuck, Pushing the Limits: Reining in Ohio’s Residency Restrictions for Sex 
Offenders, 65 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 591, 601 (2017) (“With residency restrictions in place, sex offenders 
have reduced access to treatment, often live apart from family, and, in many cases, end up being 
homeless.  Some studies even suggest that the instability caused by residency restrictions may lead to 
an increased likelihood of reoffending, contrary to the goals of the restrictions.”) (citations omitted).  
See also Lindsay A. Wagner, Sex Offender Residency Restrictions: How Common Sense Places 
Children at Risk, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 175, 195 (2009) (explaining that housing and maintaining social 
bonds in communities help to reduce recidivism rates);  Ron Wilson, Geographic Research Suggests 
Sex Offender Residency Laws May Not Work, 2 GEOGRAPHY & PUB. SAFETY 11 (2009) (reporting 
a South Carolina study showed that sex-offender buffer zones force offenders to live farther from 
treatment centers, thereby decreasing their ability to get necessary treatment, while potentially 
increasing trouble with reentry, recidivism, and strife). 
 36 See Jacob Hutt, Offline: Challenging Internet and Social Media Bans for Individuals on Supervision 
for Sex Offenses, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 663, 683–85 (2019) (noting that the Internet 
is now the primary job-seeking tool and that social media restrictions prevent individuals from 
promoting their businesses). 
 37 See James Hawthorne, Inductive Logic, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward 
N. Zalta, Spring 2018 ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/logic-inductive (“In a 
deductive logic, the premises of a valid deductive argument logically entail the conclusion, where 
logical entailment means that every logically possible state of affairs that makes the premises true 
must make the conclusion truth as well. . . . In a good inductive argument, the truth of the premises 
provides some degree of support for the truth of the conclusion . . . .”). 
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The distinction between deductive and inductive reasoning is centuries 
old.  John Locke argued in 1689, “The knowledge of the existence of 
any . . . thing, we can have only by sensation.”38  Sensation, which provides 
experiential data, is the only way to obtain knowledge of the world.  David 
Hume also drew this distinction in his work published in 1777: “All reasonings 
may be divided into two kinds, namely demonstrative reasoning, or that 
concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning matter 
of fact and existence.”
39
  These are distinct forms of reasoning that deliver 
distinct forms of knowledge.  “[O]ur reason, unassisted by experience, [can 
never] draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact.”
40
  Only 
experience, or data acquired through observation, can deliver answers about 
the external world.  One cannot use deductive reasoning to answer empirical 
questions.  A judge cannot deduce from the idea of a sex offender that 
recidivism rates are high.  That is an empirical question, which requires data 
to answer. 
Judges, however, frequently resist incorporating empirical data into their 
decisions.  The Supreme Court of the United States repeated a common 
explanation in McCleskey v. Kemp: “Legislatures also are better qualified to 
weigh and ‘evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local 
conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the 
courts.’”
41
  Courts sometimes think of themselves as using pure deductive 
reasoning, while legislatures work with statistics and studies.
42
  If a legislature 
finds that requiring sex offenders to register will reduce recidivism, courts must 
defer to that determination.
43
 
Although judges prefer not to use inductive reasoning here, many 
decisions involving sex offender regulations make claims of fact, which can 
 
 38 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 285 (Kenneth P. Winkler ed., 
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1996) (1689). 
 39 DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 22 (Eric Steinberg ed., 
Hackett Publ’g co. 2d ed. 1993) (1777). 
 40 Id. at 17. 
 41 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)). 
 42 See Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1217 (Pa. 2017) (recognizing that it is “ordinarily a 
matter for the General Assembly” to examine scientific studies, and the courts should therefore defer 
to the legislature on such issues); People v. Pepitone, 106 N.E.3d 984, 992–93 (Ill. 2018) 
(“[R]egardless of how convincing that social science may be, ‘the legislature is in a better position than 
the judiciary to gather and evaluate data bearing on complex problems.’”) (quoting People v. Minnis, 
67 N.E.3d 272, 289 (Ill. 2016)). 
 43 See cases cited supra note 42. 
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only be evaluated through such reasoning.
44
  Beginning with McKune, courts 
have made explicit claims about the recidivism rate of sex offenders: they have 
not deferred to legislative findings on what the recidivism rate is but 
incorporated empirical claims into their reasoning.
45
  The claim that the risk 
of recidivism is “frightening and high” has been quoted and repeated by courts 
since then.
46
  Some courts citing the McKune language take it as binding 
precedent that the recidivism rate is high, rather than using new studies to 
determine what the recidivism rate is.  For example, the Supreme Court of 
California in 2015 cited Smith v. Doe to support the claim that sex offenders 
pose a high recidivism risk rather than examining studies published since that 
decision.
47
  Other courts use common sense—rather than the available 
evidence—to support claims about sex offenders.
48
  The result is that courts 
make empirical claims but use no empirical work. 
Empirical data on recidivism rates and the effects of existing regulations 
are available,
49
 yet courts rarely consider these data.  In citing the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics report, the McKune Court did not establish a binding 
precedent that it is a fact that sex offenders have a high recidivism rate.  Rather, 
the Court cited an empirical study, which gives lower courts permission to 
examine other data that may undermine the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
 
 44 See HUME, supra note 1, at 10 (explaining that questions of fact cannot be answered by deduction 
but only through observation of the external world). 
 45 See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32 (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics reports to support their 
assertion that convicted sex offenders are more likely than other types of offenders to be rearrested 
for rape or sexual assault). 
 46 See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (quoting McKune, 536 U.S. at 34); People v. Mosley, 
344 P.3d 788, 804 (Cal. 2015) (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 103); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 
655, 665 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 103); State v. Mossman, 281 P.3d 153, 160 
(Kan. 2012) (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 103).  See generally, Ira Mark Ellman & Tara Ellman, 
“Frightening and High”: The Supreme Court’s Crucial Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics, 30 
CONST. COMMENT. 495 (2015) (describing lower courts’ reliance on the McKune Court’s claim). 
 47 Mosley, 344 P.3d at 804. 
 48 See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 707 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding a residency restriction based 
on testimony that “the appropriateness of such a restriction was ‘common sense,’ although . . . there 
were insufficient data to know ‘where to draw the marks.’”); Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep’t, 453 
F.3d 1010, 1015 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e believe that a residency restriction designed to reduce 
proximity between the most dangerous offenders and locations frequented by children is within the 
range of rational policy options available to a state legislature charged with protecting the health and 
welfare of its citizens.”). 
 49 See generally, RICHARD G. WRIGHT, supra note 5 (finding that sex offenders have a low rate of 
recidivism). 
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  Under McKune and Smith v. Doe, the use of data on 
sex offender recidivism is not only permissible: it is required.  Courts must 
replace their reliance on precedential reasoning and reasoning from common 
sense with inductive reasoning.  When making claims about matters of fact, 
courts must examine data acquired by experience rather than deduction. 
III.  BACKGROUND DECISIONS USING EMPIRICAL DATA IN THE SEX 
OFFENDER CONTEXT 
Despite courts’ failures to use the data in this context, there is a wealth of 
precedent that courts may consider these empirical data on sex offender laws 
and recidivism in contexts other than due process.  Smith v. Doe and McKune 
are not the only decisions that have cited empirical data.  Courts have also 
done so in determining whether the restriction is a punishment, whether it 
violates the Fourth Amendment, and whether it violates state laws. 
Courts have frequently performed the punishment analysis for sex 
offender laws because legislatures often apply them retroactively, which the ex 
post facto clause of the United States Constitution and parallel clauses in state 
constitutions forbid for punishments.  Two factors in that analysis are whether 
there is a rational non-punitive purpose for the statute and whether the statute 
is excessive in relation to that purpose.
51
  The year after McKune, the Supreme 
Court relied on its language to conclude that an Alaska registration statute did 
not impose punishment.
52
  It found the statute proportionate to the 
nonpunitive purpose of public safety because “[t]he risk of recidivism posed 
by sex offenders is ‘frightening and high.’”
53
  Since that time, however, many 
courts have reexamined the scientific literature and determined that such 
statutes are punishment because they are out of proportion to the small public 
safety risk posed by sex offenders. 
The Sixth Circuit, for example, relied on empirical studies and explicitly 
expressed its skepticism of the Smith Court’s claim.54  It determined that a sex 
 
 50 See, e.g., Taylor v. Pa. State Police, 132 A.3d 590, 606 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016) (“[W]e decline to 
conclusively resolve factual questions based on statements made in judicial decisions that are nearly 
a decade old.”). 
 51 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963). 
 52 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 104 (2003). 
 53 Id. at 103 (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002)). 
 54 See Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 704 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating that empirical studies cast doubt 
on the claim that there is a “frightening and high” risk of recidivism among sex offenders). 
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offender regulation was punishment and violated ex post facto laws because 
abundant studies showed that regulations like the one in question did not 
reduce recidivism and may actually increase it.
55
  Rather than relying on Smith 
and McKune, the Sixth Circuit examined multiple studies that showed that 
registration requirements did not reduce recidivism, and therefore had no 
rational relation to a nonpunitive purpose.
56
  The Sixth Circuit provided a 
model for how courts should interpret Smith and McKune: not as binding 
precedent establishing that sex offenders have a high recidivism rate, but as a 
precedent that requires courts to examine studies, just as those courts did. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of North Carolina found that an ankle 
monitor requirement violated the Fourth Amendment because the defendant 
had shown through empirical evidence that the recidivism rate for sex 
offenders is low.
57
  To establish that the ankle monitoring, which was a Fourth 
Amendment search,
58
 was a reasonable search “[t]he State has the burden of 
coming forward with some evidence that its [Satellite-Based Monitoring] 
program assists in apprehending sex offenders, deters or prevents new sex 
offenses, or otherwise protects the public.”
59
  The court found that the search 
was unreasonable because the evidence demonstrated that it was unnecessary. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania struck down a county 
ordinance that extended residency restrictions for sex offenders as violating 
the State Parole and Sentencing Codes because the studies presented showed 
that it contradicted the rehabilitative goals of those codes.
60
  Although the court 
did not directly cite studies, it relied on empirical claims that were supported 
by studies in the briefs: for example, the court wrote that the statute would 
have the “unintended effect of threatening public safety, by depriving sex 
offenders of access to resources which have been shown to reduce the risks of 
recidivism,”
61




 55 Id. at 704–705. 
 56 Id. 
 57 State v. Grady, 831 S.E.2d 542, 565 (N.C. 2019). 
 58 Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 310 (2015). 
 59 Grady, 831 S.E.2d at 568. 
 60 Fross v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 20 A.3d 1193, 1207 (Pa. 2011). 
 61 Id. at 1205. 
 62 See Brief of the Ass’n for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiffs/Appellees at 16, Fross v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 438 F. App’x.  99 (3d. Cir. 2011) (No. 09-
2036) (showing that such restrictions intensify “the psychosocial stressors that are linked to re-
offense”). 
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These decisions show that there is precedent for incorporating the 
abundant empirical data on sex offender statutes into decisions on the validity 
of those statutes.  Courts should apply this same use of data to the due process 
context. 
IV.  DUE PROCESS CONSTRAINTS 
Statutes regulating sex offenders vary widely, and how a state chooses to 
whom the restrictions apply determines whether procedural or substantive due 
process requires a court to examine the evidence.  Procedural due process 
protects only those who are subjected to a statute that distinguishes between 
offenders who pose a high risk of recidivism and those who do not.  If a statute 
seeks to impose restrictions on all those convicted of a certain offense, more 
procedure will not help.  But substantive due process protects those who are 
subjected to statutes that have no rational basis.  Legislatures cite public safety 
as the state interest in these statutes, but the scientific consensus shows that the 
means chosen by the legislatures are not rationally related to that end.  Finally, 
due process prohibits the use of irrebuttable presumptions that former sex 
offenders are a danger to the public when they can show that they pose no 
such danger.  These three components of due process together can restrain 
irrationally restrictive statutes. 
A.  Procedural Due Process 
When a restriction applies only to offenders who are likely to recidivate, 
due process requires that there be a procedure in which the offender may 
present evidence of her recidivism risk.  The procedural due process analysis 
involves weighing the private interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation of 
that interest against the cost to the government of additional procedures that 
would lower the risk of erroneous deprivation.
63
  Courts that have struck down 
sex offender statutes that apply to all those convicted of certain crimes for 
procedural due process violations have mistakenly defined an erroneous 
deprivation as imposing a regulation on someone who is unlikely to 
 
 63 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976) (listing three factors to consider when determining 
whether an individual has received due process under the Constitution). 
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  As the legislature intended to deprive all convicted offenders of 
these rights, the deprivation is not erroneous.
65
 
The Supreme Court clarified this issue in Connecticut Department of Pub. 
Safety v. Doe (“CDPS”), holding that a convicted sex offender has no right to 
a determination that she is dangerous before she is required to register if the 
state makes conviction the only prerequisite to registration.
66
  “[T]he law’s 
requirements turn on an offender’s conviction alone,” the Court explained, “a 
fact that a convicted offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded 
opportunity to contest.”
67
  It would not be an error to require a non-dangerous 
offender to register because the legislature intended all those convicted to 
register, not only dangerous offenders.
68
  Furthermore, under the Adam 
Walsh Act, the registration requirement is conditioned solely on the 
conviction offense, which prevents any procedural due process challenge to 
registration.
69
  The burden to the state of additional procedure outweighs the 
defendant’s interest in additional procedure because the risk of erroneously 
requiring someone who was not convicted of a sex offense to register as a sex 
offender is virtually zero.  Any statute that follows the Adam Walsh Act’s 
model of classification based on offense complies with procedural due 
process. 
If, conversely, a statute does condition a sex offender regulation on the risk 
the offender poses, that offender has a procedural due process right.  In 
 
 64 See, e.g., State v. Bani, 36 P.3d 1255, 1267 (Haw. 2001), as amended on clarification (Dec. 6, 2001) 
(“[P]ersons convicted of crimes listed under HRS chapter 846E who do not pose a significant danger 
to the community are at substantial risk of being erroneously deprived of their liberty interests.”). 
 65 See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003) (“In short, even if respondent could 
prove that he is not likely to be currently dangerous, Connecticut has decided that the registry 
information of all sex offenders—currently dangerous or not—must be publicly disclosed.”). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 709 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Once such a legislative classification has been 
drawn, additional procedures are unnecessary, because the statute does not provide a potential 
exemption for individuals who seek to prove that they are not individually dangerous or likely to 
offend against neighboring schoolchildren.”).  But see United States v. Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d 
971, 975 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (defining an erroneous deprivation as one that is not necessary to protect 
the public). 
 69 See 34 U.S.C.A. § 20911 (West 2017) (defining three tiers of sex offender status according to the 
underlying offense); 34 U.S.C. § 20915(a) (2018) (conditioning registration period on tier 
classification).  See also Elizabeth Reiner Platt, Gangsters to Greyhounds: The Past, Present, and 
Future of Offender Registration, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 727, 771 (2013) (“[T]his issue 
is now irrelevant in the case of sex offender registries in those states striving to comply with the AWA, 
since the Act mandates the category-based approach discussed in CDP.”). 
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Millard v. Rankin, for example, a Colorado statute violated procedural due 
process because it instructed a court to determine whether a convicted sex 
offender was likely to re-offend but denied the defendant an adequate 
opportunity to be heard.
70
  The deficiency in the process was that the plaintiff’s 
petition to be removed from the registry was denied without any “evident basis 
to deny the petition.”
71
  When a legislature only imposes a sex offender 
regulation on those with a high risk of recidivism, an offender has a right to be 
exempted from the regulation if she can demonstrate that her risk level is low.
72
 
Although there is no procedural due process right to a risk level 
determination in general, there may be such a right if the state purports to only 
restrict those who have a high risk of recidivism or if the state leaves the 
restriction to the judge’s discretion.
73
 
B.  Substantive Due Process 
The CDPS Court suggested “that respondent’s claim is actually a 
substantive challenge to Connecticut’s statute ‘recast in “procedural due 
process” terms,’” but it did not analyze the possible substantive due process 
challenge.
74
  Substantive due process protects fundamental rights and liberty 
interests from unreasonable government interference.
75
  If a state action 
interferes with a fundamental right, it must be narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest.
76
  If the action does not implicate a fundamental right, 
it need only have a rational relation to a legitimate government interest.
77
  
Which of these two levels of scrutiny—strict scrutiny or rational basis—applies 
depends on whether the private right asserted is “so rooted in the traditions 




 70 Millard v. Rankin 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1232–33 (D. Colo. 2017). 
 71 Id. at 1233. 
72  Id. 
 73 See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003) (suggesting that part of the reason for 
upholding the Connecticut statute was that the state explicitly stated on the registry website that it had 
not determined that registered individuals are currently dangerous). 
 74 Id. at 8 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 308 (1993)). 
 75 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). 
 76 Id. at 721. 
 77 Id. at 728. 
 78 Id. at 721 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). 
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Although others have noted that there appears to be little hope for 
substantive due process challenges to reign in sex offender restrictions,
79
 some 
restrictions implicate fundamental rights and fail heightened scrutiny, and even 
those that only trigger rational basis scrutiny fail when they plainly violate the 
scientific consensus. 
1.  Some Sex Offender Restrictions Infringe on Fundamental Rights 
While federal courts frequently determine that the standard established in 
Washington v. Glucksberg80 makes it difficult to recognize a fundamental right 
implicated by sex offender regulations,
81
 states recognize rights not recognized 
in federal courts.  State substantive due process provides an avenue to protect 
these rights from the unnecessary imposition of sex offender restrictions.  
Three important rights are frequently involved: the publication of registry 
information implicates privacy and reputation rights, residency restrictions 
implicate rights to live with one’s family, and restrictions on use of public 
spaces implicate to right to travel freely within a state.  In states that recognize 
 
 79 See, e.g., Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, supra note 6, 1123 (“For the sex offender, a 
substantive due process claim is especially problematic.”); Elizabeth Reiner Platt, Gangsters to 
Greyhounds: The Past, Present, and Future of Offender Registration, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 727, 772–73 (2013) (“With one narrow exception in the Third Circuit, federal appellate 
courts have found that sex offender registries do not implicate any fundamental right.  Thus, almost 
all courts have determined the constitutionality of registries under the undemanding rational basis 
review test.  Sex offender registries have passed this test in every circuit in which this question has 
been litigated, although some courts have expressed concerns that registries are overbroad.”). 
 80 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (“We must therefore ‘exercise the utmost care whenever 
we are asked to break new ground in this field,’ lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause 
be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court.”) (quoting Collins v. 
City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) and Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 
502 (1977)) (citations omitted). 
 81 Id.  See also Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 500 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he right 
asserted here is not a fundamental right deeply rooted in our Nation’s history.”); Doe v. Moore, 410 
F.3d 1337, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e can find no history or tradition that would elevate the issue 
here to a fundamental right.”); Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e are forced 
to conclude that persons who have been convicted of serious sex offenses do not have a fundamental 
right to be free from the registration and notification requirements set forth in the Alaska statute.”); 
Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 643 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[A] fundamental right is not implicated . . . 
.”); Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 405 (3rd Cir. 1999) (“Megan’s Law does not restrict plaintiffs’ 
freedom of action with respect to their families and therefore does not intrude upon the aspect of the 
right to privacy . . . .”); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The collection and 
dissemination of information under the Washington law does not violate any protected privacy 
interest, and does not amount to a deprivation of liberty or property.”). 
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these rights as fundamental, strict scrutiny applies under the state constitution’s 
substantive due process provision. 
First, whether the publication of an offender’s conviction information 
infringes on her state privacy or reputation rights depends on whether a court 
distinguishes between the publication of such information and normal public 
availability of criminal conviction information.  Since conviction information 
is already publicly available, courts have generally found that compiling and 
publishing it does not violate any right to privacy or reputation.
82
  When, 
however, the registry publishes more information or presents it in a 
distinguishable form, doing so may implicate fundamental rights.  For 
example, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized in Doe v. Department of 
Public Safety that publishing the information online risked inflicting harms 
“ranging from public scorn and ostracism to harassment, to difficulty in finding 
and maintaining employment, to threats of violence and actual violence,” and 
determined that such publication therefore implicated the offender’s privacy 
rights.
83
  The Alaska Court relied on the United States Supreme Court’s 
recognition that there is a distinction between records publicly available in a 
courthouse’s physical files and those available online.
84
 Similarly, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined that “the aggregation and 
dissemination of publicly available information has triggered a right to 
privacy.”
85
  The most important factor in determining that this distribution of 
information implicated privacy and reputation rights was that the statute 
implicitly branded the plaintiff as a public danger.
86
  Publishing sex offender 
registration information is not equivalent to keeping criminal records available 
in physical files, and both state and federal courts should recognize these 
injuries to privacy and reputation where such rights are protected. 
 
 82 See, e.g., Moore, 410 F.3d at 1345 (“[A] state’s publication of truthful information that is already 
available to the public does not infringe the fundamental constitutional rights of liberty and privacy”); 
People v. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d 288, 303 (Ill. 2004) (finding that a sex offender registry statute does 
not violate the defendant’s right to privacy because his information was already publicly available).  
See also Nilson v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Information readily available to 
the public is not protected by the constitutional right to privacy.”). 
 83 Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 444 P.3d 116, 130 (Alaska 2019).  See also Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 
409 (N.J. 1995) (“The fact that plaintiff’s home address may be publicly available, therefore, does 
not lead ineluctably to the conclusion that public disclosure of his address implicates no privacy 
interest.”). 
 84 Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 444 P.3d at 129 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for 
Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764 (1989)). 
 85 Doe v. Att’y Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1012 (Mass. 1997). 
 86 Id. at 1013. 
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Second, courts have been more reluctant to recognize that residency 
restrictions infringe on the fundamental rights of the family relationship 
because they do not see a close enough connection between a residency 
restriction and the offender’s relation to her family.  The Supreme Court has 
generally recognized family relations to be protected by fundamental rights 
that trigger strict scrutiny,
87
 and there is a fundamental right to live with one’s 
family.
88
  Courts have not found, however, that restrictions on where that 
residence can be directly infringe on that right.
89
  Neither state
90
 nor federal 
courts
91
 have recognized a fundamental right to live in a particular place with 
one’s family.  Even when presented with the reality that an offender’s family 
may not be able to afford to relocate in order to live together, courts have 
found residency restrictions not to involve the right to live with family because 
they do not absolutely bar doing so.
92
  Courts have not recognized that 
residency restrictions implicate fundamental rights, and they do not apply strict 
scrutiny. 
Courts have not reached any clarity in a third area: whether a restriction 
on a sex offender’s use of a public area implicates a fundamental right to travel 
 
 87 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (“[T]he decision to marry is a fundamental 
right . . . .”). 
 88 See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505–06 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he choice 
of relatives in this degree of kinship to live together may not lightly be denied by the State.”). 
 89 See, e.g., People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (finding no fundamental right to 
live with one’s family within 500 feet of a school); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 663–64 (Iowa 
2005) (“[A]n alleged infringement on a familial right is unconstitutional only when an infringement 
has a direct and substantial impact on the familial relationship . . . .  We do not believe this impact is 
present in this case.”) (citations omitted). 
 90 See, e.g., Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 776 (denying defendant’s argument that he has a fundamental right 
to live with his mother within 500 feet of a school).  
 91 See Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1343–45 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that a residency restriction did 
not implicate a fundamental right because it did not directly restrict the plaintiff’s actions with his 
family); Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 711 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he statute does not directly regulate 
the family relationship or prevent any family member from residing with a sex offender in a residence 
that is consistent with the statute.  We therefore hold that § 692A.2A does not infringe upon a 
constitutional liberty interest relating to matters of marriage and family in a fashion that requires 
heightened scrutiny.”); Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Megan’s Law does 
not restrict plaintiffs’ freedom of action with respect to their families and therefore does not intrude 
upon the aspect of the right to privacy that protects an individual’s independence in making certain 
types of important decisions.”). 
 92 See, e.g., Miller, 405 F.3d at 711 (applying rational basis scrutiny because the statute did not 
absolutely bar living with family, despite evidence of the difficulty of doing so); Seering, 701 N.W.2d 
at 664 (“While the residency restriction may impact the Seerings insofar as they cannot choose the 
precise location where they can establish their home, it does not absolutely prevent them from living 
together.”). 
April 2021] SEX OFFENSES 537 
   
 
freely within a state.  In Doe v. Miller, the Eighth Circuit recognized that there 
may be a right to intrastate travel related to sex offender restrictions but found 
it inapplicable in that case.
93




 courts recognize a 
fundamental right to intrastate travel, but that right has not been found to be 
burdened by laws prohibiting sex offenders from entering public spaces.  In 
Standley v. Town of Woodfin, the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
determined that a statute prohibiting sex offenders from entering public parks 
did not infringe on the right to intrastate travel.
96
  The right to intrastate travel 
was not burdened because it only protected travel that was necessary for daily 
activities, which did not include the use of parks.
97
  Similarly, the Seventh 
Circuit opined that a ban on entrance into public parks did not involve a 
fundamental right,
98
 but that statement was dictum as the court found that the 
statute passed even strict scrutiny.
99
  It is not clear whether the right to travel 
freely within a state also includes the right to use and be present in public 
places. 
In some states, sex offender laws implicate fundamental rights and trigger 
heightened scrutiny.  There is a wide variety of sex offender regulations, and 
some infringe on rights that states recognize as fundamental. 
2.  Heightened Scrutiny for Fundamental Rights: In States Where a 
Fundamental Right is Recognized 
When a sex offender restriction implicates a fundamental right, courts 
must apply strict scrutiny,
100
 which requires them to consider empirical 
evidence undermining the ostensible relation of the statute to the purpose.  
 
 93 Miller, 405 F.3d at 712–13. 
 94 See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2002); Lutz v. City of York, 899 
F.2d 255, 268 (3d Cir. 1990); Spencer v. Casavilla, 903 F.2d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 95 See, e.g., Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1161 (Cal. 1995); State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 
1113 (Fla. 2004); State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 864 (Ohio 2001); Brandmiller v. Arreola, 544 
N.W.2d 894, 898 (Wis. 1996). 
 96 Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 661 S.E.2d 728, 731 (N.C. 2008). 
 97 Id.  See also People v. Pepitone, 106 N.E.3d 984, 989 (Ill. 2008) (stating that there is no fundamental 
right to visit a public park). 
 98 Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 771 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 99 See id. at 774 (“[E]ven assuming that we ought to consider this ban under the strict scrutiny standard, 
we still would hold it was valid as the narrowest reasonable means for the City to advance its 
compelling interest of protecting its children from the demonstrable threat of sexual abuse by Mr. 
Doe.”). 
 100 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (explaining fundamental rights protected by 
substantive due process). 
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When substantive due process strict scrutiny applies, the state infringement on 
the fundamental right must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.
101
  In Doe v. Department of Public Safety, for example, the Supreme 
Court of Alaska applied strict scrutiny and determined that “there is no 
compelling interest justifying registration if an offender does not present a 
danger to the public.”
102
  The court did not incorporate empirical evidence into 
this decision, but it instead held that the plaintiff had a right to file a civil action 
in which he may prove that he does not pose a risk to public safety, including 
by expert testimony.
103
  Although courts have not applied strict scrutiny to sex 
offender regulations frequently, when it is applied there is a strong argument 
to consider the empirical evidence that shows that the laws are not narrowly 
tailored to public safety. 
3.  Rational Basis Scrutiny 
Even if no fundamental right is involved, courts should find that many sex 
offender restrictions fail rational basis scrutiny because the empirical data 
show that the laws are both unnecessary and ineffective.  While rational basis 
review requires courts to uphold legislative choices even when they are “based 
on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data,”
104
 there is 
no rational basis when empirical data directly contradict legislative 
determinations. 
Although state and federal courts have generally agreed that sex offender 
restrictions have a rational basis even when the scientific consensus 
undermines that basis, those decisions rely on epistemological fallacies:
105
 
courts take the McKune quotation106 as unquestionable empirical truth, or they 
rely on conclusory statements instead of evidence. 
By repeating the McKune Court’s empirical claim, courts have failed to 
determine whether sex offender restrictions are “reasonably related to [the] 
promotion and protection” of legitimate government interests.
107
  For example, 
 
 101 Id. at 721. 
 102 444 P.3d 116, 124, 126, 132 (Alaska 2019). 
 103 Id. at 135–36. 
 104 Minerva Dairy, Inc. v. Harsdorf, 905 F.3d 1047, 1055 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Minerva 
Dairy, Inc. v. Pfaff, 139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019) (citing Monarch Beverage Co. v. Cook, 861 F.3d 678, 683 
(7th Cir. 2017)). 
 105 See supra Part II (examining the courts’ failures to properly account for empirical data). 
 106 See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002) (claiming “a frightening and high risk of recidivism”). 
 107 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735. 
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the Illinois Supreme Court determined that a law forbidding sex offenders 
from public parks was rationally related to the legitimate government interest 
of protecting the public because sex offenders have a high recidivism rate.
108
  It 
explicitly stated that empirical work was irrelevant: “The problem for the 
defendant is that, regardless of how convincing that social science may be, ‘the 
legislature is in a better position than the judiciary to gather and evaluate data 
bearing on complex problems.’”
109
  The Illinois Court cited McKune and other 
cases to support its assertion instead of citing empirical work, ignoring the 
requirement that a law have a rational relation to a legitimate state interest.
110
  
The Supreme Court of Iowa,
111





 have also made this mistake.  These courts all premised 
their conclusions on empirical claims and stated that empirical work is 
irrelevant.  They argued that there is a rational basis for the laws because they 
are necessary to protect the world from sex offenders, who have a high 
recidivism rate because the McKune Court said so. 
Other federal courts have used conclusory statements to find a rational 
basis even when empirical data contradict those statements.  Courts have done 
little analysis of whether the means are rationally related to the legitimate 
interest.  In Doe v. Moore, the Eleventh Circuit conflated the step asking 
whether there was a legitimate state interest with the step asking whether the 
means were rationally related to that interest: “We agree with the state that the 
Sex Offender Act meets the rational basis standard.  It has long been in the 
interest of government to protect its citizens from criminal activity and we find 
no exceptional circumstances in this case to invalidate the law.”
114
  The 
Eleventh Circuit is not alone here.  Courts have repeatedly failed to apply any 
 
 108 People v. Pepitone, 106 N.E.3d 984, 992, 994–95 (Ill. 2018). 
 109 Id. at 992–93 (quoting People v. Minnis, 67 N.E.3d 272, 289 (Ill. 2016)).  
 110 Id. at 992, 994–95. 
 111 See State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 665 (Iowa 2005) (finding the standard for rational basis met 
because, “[a]s numerous authorities have acknowledged, ‘[t]he risk of recidivism posed by sex 
offenders is “frightening and high.”’”) (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103). 
 112 See Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 661 S.E.2d 728, 731 (N.C. 2008) (citing Conn. Dep’t of Pub. 
Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) and McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002) to support the claim that 
the public needs to be protected from sex offenders). 
 113 See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 714–15 (8th Cir. 2005) (“There can be no doubt of a legislature’s 
rationality in believing that ‘[s]ex offenders are a serious threat in this Nation,’ and that ‘[w]hen 
convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to 
be re-arrested for a new rape or sexual assault.’”) (alterations in original) (quoting Conn. Dep’t of 
Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 4). 
 114 410 F.3d 1337, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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analysis to the question of rational relation and simply concluded that there is 
a rational relation.  For example, the Eighth Circuit stated its belief that a 
residency restriction was rationally related to public safety without any 
explanation or support: “[W]e believe that a residency restriction designed to 
reduce proximity between the most dangerous offenders and locations 
frequented by children is within the range of rational policy options available 




In the few existing examples where courts apply rational basis with any 
scrutiny of the selected means at all, they strike down sex offender regulations 
as contrary to the evidence.  In In re Taylor, the Supreme Court of California 
struck down a residency restriction statute under the due process clause of the 
United States Constitution.
116
  The court relied on the trial court’s findings of 
fact to conclude that the blanket enforcement of sex offender  residency 
restrictions was not rationally related to public safety.
117
  The trial court heard 
testimony and determined that only 2.9% of the multifamily rental housing in 
the county complied with the residency restrictions and that even less of that 
housing was available for rent.
118
  It also found that application of the residency 
retractions hindered sex offender treatment and caused homelessness.
119
  The 
Supreme Court of California determined that the regulation was not rationally 
related to the legitimate state interest in public safety because “[t]he increased 
incidence of homelessness has in turn hampered the surveillance and 
supervision of such parolees, thereby thwarting the legitimate governmental 
objective behind the registration statute (§ 290) to which the residency 
restrictions attach; that of protecting the public from sex offenders.”
120
 
This finding was based on an analysis of empirical work.  The evidence 
that the Supreme Court of California relied on included a report from the 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and testimony by the 
 
 115 Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep’t, 453 F.3d 1010, 1015 (8th Cir. 2006).  See also Gunderson v. 
Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 643–44 (8th Cir. 2003) (explaining the legislative purpose and stating that the 
means are reasonably related to that purpose); Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 501 
(6th Cir. 2007) (stating that the court was “constrained to conclude that the rationale articulated in 
the statute itself satisfies the rational-basis standard” without any explanation). 
 116 343 P.3d 867, 878, 882 (Cal. 2015). 
 117 Id. at 880–82. 
 118 Id. at 873. 
 119 Id. at 877. 
 120 Id. at 881. 
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Director of the San Diego County Department of Housing and Community 
Development, a detective, a parole agent, a psychotherapist, and a social 
worker—all of whom had professional experience with registered sex 
offenders.
121
  The Taylor court did not strike down all residency restrictions 
but determined that they could only be applied when “based on, and 
supported by, the particularized circumstances of each individual parolee.”
122
  
If the evidence in the record shows that the challenged regulation is contrary 
to the legitimate state interest, a court must find that there is no rational basis.
123
  
Without such evidence, a court may decline to examine any introduced on 
appeal and uphold the statute by default.
124
 
Courts currently find that there is a rational basis for any law that the 
legislature claims is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose, but they 
should take a more critical approach.  When all the available evidence shows 
that residency restrictions, for example, harm public safety, courts must find 
that there is no rational basis for a residency restriction.  Refusing to examine 
the evidence inevitably leads to upholding statutes that violate due process. 
C.  Impermissible Irrebuttable Presumption 
In addition to the procedural and substantive components, due process 
also forbids laws that establish irrebuttable presumptions that are not 
universally true.
125
  There is a strong argument under irrebuttable presumption 
doctrine to introduce empirical evidence, but the doctrine is not alive on the 
 
 121 Id. at 873–81. 
 122 Id. at 882. 
 123 Id. at 869.  See also State v. Dykes, 744 S.E.2d 505, 510 (S.C. 2013) (“The complete absence of any 
opportunity for judicial review to assess a risk of re-offending, which is beyond the norm of Jessica’s 
law, is arbitrary and cannot be deemed rationally related to the legislature’s stated purpose of 
protecting the public from those with a high risk of re-offending.”). 
 124 See, e.g., People v. Avila-Briones, 49 N.E.3d 428, 451 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (“Unlike Taylor, this case 
does not involve detailed factual findings showing that Illinois’s sex offender laws undermine the very 
goal that they were designed to serve . . . . Based solely on the record before us, we cannot say that 
the laws at issue here are an irrational means to protect the public from sex offenders.”). 
 125 See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973) (“[I]t is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny 
an individual the resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of 
nonresidence, when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true, in fact, and when the 
State has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination.”); Cleveland Bd. of 
Educ. V. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 648 (1974) (“While the regulations no doubt represent a good-faith 
attempt to achieve a laudable goal, they cannot pass muster under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, because they employ irrebuttable presumptions that unduly penalize a 
female teacher for deciding to bear a child.”). 
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  Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur127 demonstrates the 
applicability of this doctrine to sex offender regulations.  The defendant school 
board established a policy that pregnant teachers must take maternity leave 
because it believed that they were physically incapable of work.  The Court 
found a due process violation because “[t]he rules contain an irrebuttable 
presumption of physical incompetency, and that presumption applies even 
when the medical evidence as to an individual woman’s physical status might 
be wholly to the contrary.”
128
  Although there was a legitimate state interest in 
requiring those who needed maternity leave to take it, pregnant teachers had 
a due process right to rebut the presumption that they could not work.
129
  
Similarly, even if there is a state interest in requiring dangerous offenders to 
register and follow other restrictions, sex offenders have a due process right to 
demonstrate by the use of evidence that they do not fall into the category of 
dangerous offenders that the laws are meant to regulate. 
Pennsylvania has recognized that the proscription on irrebuttable 
presumptions applies to sex offender laws under the state due process clause.   
In In re J.B. the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that automatic registration 
requirements for all juveniles adjudicated delinquent in regard to certain 
sexual offenses relied on an impermissible irrebuttable presumption that 
juvenile sex offenders were highly likely to recidivate.
130
  The irrebuttable 
presumption was impermissible because “that presumption [was] not 
universally true and a reasonable alternative means currently exist[ed] for 
determining which juvenile offenders are likely to reoffend.”
131
  The court 
relied on empirical work to show that the presumption was not universally 
true: it cited a law journal article discussing the data, an empirical report by the 
Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Judges’ Commission, and the trial court opinion 
 
 126 See Schanuel v. Anderson, 708 F.2d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he continuing validity of the 
[irrebuttable presumption] doctrine has been questioned repeatedly . . . . The irrebuttable 
presumption doctrine has been discredited because it is unworkable regardless of the interest which 
might have invoked it.  We decline to revive the doctrine in this case and accordingly reject Schanuel’s 
first due process argument.”); Deborah Dinner, Recovering the Lafleur Doctrine, 22 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 343, 387–88 (2010) (describing irrebuttable presumption doctrine as widely criticized and 
no longer followed). 
 127 414 U.S. 632. 
 128 Id. at 644. 
 129 Id. at 647. 
 130 107 A.3d 1, 14 (Pa. 2014). 
 131 Id. 
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  The court prescribed an individualized risk assessment 
as the alternative means.
133
  Because empirical work showed that juveniles were 
not necessarily a recidivism risk, they were entitled to a factual assessment of 
the need for the restrictions.
134
 
In 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court began to apply its reasoning in 
In re J.B. to adult cases.  In Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, the court decided 
that the adult sex offender laws violate irrebuttable presumption doctrine if 
recidivism rates are low and if tier-based registration systems are ineffective.
135
  
The court, however, remanded the case for a hearing to allow the parties to 
offer evidence and argument regarding whether scientific data sufficiently 
undermine the legislature’s findings.
136
  Striking down the statute would only 
be appropriate after fully hearing the scientific evidence.
137
  In this way, the 
court struck a balance: it maintained deference to the legislature while 
declaring “this Court will not turn a blind eye to the development of scientific 




Other jurisdictions have also shown that there may be room for a similar 
irrebuttable presumption challenge.  For example, the Northern District of 
New York held that a provision of the Adam Walsh Act subjecting certain 
offenders to detention and electronic monitoring without a hearing on whether 
 
 132 Id. at 17–18. 
 133 Id. at 19. 
 134 See also Doe v. Police Comm’r of Bos., 951 N.E.2d 337, 343 (Mass. 2011) (striking down an 
irrebuttable presumption that those convicted of a level-three sex offense are a danger to other rest 
home residents and must be barred from residing in rest homes).  But see Doe #1 v. Marshall, No. 
2:15-CV-606-WKW, 2018 WL 1321034, at *9 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 14, 2018) (finding that CDPS 
precludes consideration of irrebuttable presumption doctrine). 
 135 232 A.3d 567, 596 (Pa. 2020).  See also Taylor v. Pa. State Police of Pa., 132 A.3d 590, 606–07 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2016) (relying on studies showing that sex offenders have very low recidivism rates to 
conclude that the presumption that they are a danger is not universally true for irrebuttable 
presumption purposes); Huu Cao v. Pa. State Police, No. 512 M.D. 2015, 2019 WL 5208898, at *9 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 16, 2019) (“Mr. Cao has stated [a claim] . . . that SORNA II’s irrebuttable 
presumption violates procedural due process.”).  But see State v. Martin, 51 N.E.3d 537 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2016) (“The juveniles at issue in J.B. were adjudicated delinquent of certain sexually oriented 
offenses, were automatically classified as Tier III sex offenders, and became subject to a lifetime 
registration under Pennsylvania’s SORNA.  The juveniles were not convicted of a sexually oriented 
offense in adult court, as Martin was here.”) (citations omitted). 
 136 232 A.3d at 595 n.22. 
 137 See id. (remanding to allow parties to proffer evidence and argument regarding the scientific 
evidence). 
 138 Id. at 596. 
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such conditions were necessary violated the United States Constitution’s 
restriction on irrebuttable presumptions.
139
  Such a holding opens a broad 
opportunity to show that sex offender post release laws are unconstitutional: 
any time that a statute presumes that a person convicted of a sex offense will 
be a danger to the public, that person has a right to show there is no such risk 
before any post release laws apply.  People who are convicted of sexual 
offenses but can demonstrate that they pose no real threat to society—like 
teachers whose pregnancy will not interfere with their teaching ability—should 
be exempt from post-release regulations under irrebuttable presumption 
doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
As a politically unpopular group, sex offenders are unlikely to have 
legislatures change the laws for their benefit.  In fact, as the proposed New 
York public transportation ban and other recent statutes show, restrictions are 
becoming more severe despite the evidence that they are ineffective.  It is a 
mistake to seek change only through the legislature.  Due process, under both 
the United States Constitution and state constitutions, forbids these 
procedurally deficient and irrational laws.  While courts say that they are 
leaving the work of interpreting the science to the legislatures, they also rely 
on empirical claims in their reasoning.  A claim that residency restrictions are 
rationally related to public safety is an empirical question that can only be 
answered by observation of the external world.  Judges cannot deduce the 
answer from their chambers. 
Policies and treatments that prevent recidivism are available, and states 
could use them to provide real protection to the public.
140
  Washington State, 
for example, has not implemented the provisions of the Adam Walsh Act that 
condition registration requirements on conviction charges, instead relying on 
evidence-based risk assessments to determine who must register.
141
  In 2016, 
the Washington Sex Offender Policy Board recommended that the state 
remain out of compliance with the Adam Walsh Act, giving up federal funds, 
 
 139 United States v. Karper, 847 F. Supp. 2d 350, 360 (N.D.N.Y. 2011).  See also Dean v. McWherter, 
70 F.3d 43, 46 (6th Cir. 1995) (applying irrebuttable presumption doctrine to a sex offender 
regulation but finding it did not apply because there was no liberty interest that triggered due process 
rights). 
 140 See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 285 (describing the success of a prison-based treatment program). 
 141 Id. at 288–89. 
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because implementing it “would be less effective at protecting public safety 
than the current process.”
142
  In most states, however, the existing sex offender 
laws fail to protect the public when compared to no action or to an evidence-
based alternative.  If courts struck these laws down, legislatures might be forced 
to find solutions that would prevent future harm.  By ignoring the evidence 
and upholding ineffective laws, courts are validating statutes that harm both 




 142 WASH. STATE SEX OFFENDER POL’Y BD., WASHINGTON’S COMPLIANCE WITH SORNA 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE SEX OFFENDER POLICY BOARD 5 (2016), 
https://sgc.wa.gov/sites/default/files/public/sopb/documents/sorna_findings_and_recommendations.
pdf. 
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